December, 1917.

RECENT OASES
B.iLLS AND NoTEs-LABIurry OF AN AccommoDATI(N PARTY DEFRAUDED
BY THE ACCOMMODATED PARY-This is an action by the payee of a promis-

sory note against the accommodation indorsers, who signed the note before

delivery to the payee. The defendants plead that their signatures were procured by the fraud and deceit of the maker, the accommodated party. Tlie
plaintiff payee did not participate in the fraud and had no knowledge of it. On
the faith of the indorsements, the payee advanced a large sum of money to
the maker. Held, that the payee is subject to the defense interposed, because
under the N. I. L. the payee cannot be a holder in due course. Gate City National Bank v. Bunton, 296 S. XV. 375 (Mo. 1927).
No case decided under the N. I. L. has been found to support the denial
of recovery to the payee under these circumstances. The disposition of the
case, it is submitted, ought not, and does not, depend solely upon a determination of the question whether the payee can be a holder in due course under
the Negotiable Instruments Law. In the first place, the payee should recover
on the merits. He has been innocent of the fraud, and unaffected by knowledge of it. Only on the security of the indorsers' credit was the payee willing
to deal with the maker of the instrument. The one who induced the payee to
act ought not to be permitted now to deny his liability on the ground of the
fraud of a third person. True, the anomalous indorser is also innocent of the
fraud, but he who lends his credit as an inducement, should take care whom
lie so sponsors, for he is aware that others will act in reliance on his signature. Moreover, if the accommodating party can defeat recovery on this
ground, the very purpose of an ordinary and usual business transaction is frustrated. In the second place, the position of the anomalous indorser is closely
analogous to that of a surety in a broad sense.' In fact, many cases before
the N. I. L. held such an indorser to be a surety. One. of the well established
doctrines of the law of suretyship is that the fact that the principal debtor has
victimized the surety is no defense to the surety against the creditor.' This
proposition ought to apply with equal force to its analogue in the realm of
bills and notes, independently of the problem of the payee's ability to be a
holder in due course under the N. I. L. A still stronger footing for the proposition advocated is the chain of authority prior to the N. I. L. which established that if a person was induced to place his signature upon a note as an
accommodation party by the fraud of the maker, he was notwithstanding, liable
to the payee, if it appeared that the payee did not know of the fraud.4 There
'Good

v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90 (1877); Tanner v. Gude, lOO Ga. 157, 27

S. E. 938 (986); Union Trust Co. v. McCrum, 145 App. Div. 409, 129 N. Y.
Supp. 1o78 (19II). See also STEARNS, SURETYSHIP (:d ed. 1915) § I.
'Good v. Martin, supra note I; Bank v. Rivers, x16 Ala. I, 22 So. 58o
(1897) ; Rogers v. Schulenberg, III Cal. 154, 43 Pac. 899 (1896); Kanakee
Coal Co. v. Crane Bros., 138 Ill. 207, 27 N. E. 935 (1891).
'Holm v. Jamieson, 173 Il1. 295, 50 N. E. 702 (I898); United States v.
Peck, 53 Me. 284 (1865); Bigelow v. Comegys, 50 Ohio 256 (1855). See
STEARNS, SURETYSHIP (2d ed. 1915) § io8.
'Anderson v. Warne, 71 IIl. 20 (873); Craig v. Hobbs, 44 Ind. 363
(1873) ; Clothier v. Adriance, 51 N. Y. 322 (1873) ; Lancaster Co. Nat. Bank

v. Garber, 178 Pa. 9I, 35 Atl. 848 (1896).
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is no provision of the N. I. L. which abrogates the common law rule. Therefore, it shou'd still obtain. One case with facts identical with those of the
principal case, decided since the N. I. L., reached the conclusion here contended for, without citing the N. I. L.'
CITIZENS-RESIDENCE IN UNITED STATES A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO DESCENT OF RIGHTS TO CHE.nanmi-A federal statute' provides that all children

born out of the limits of the United States, whose fathers were or may be
citizens of the United States, are citizens, "but the rights of citizenship shall
not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States."
Chin Bow was born in China in 1914. Both his father and grandfather are
citizens of the United States, the former having been born in China, and the
latter in the United States. The father had never been in this country until
1922. In 1925, Chin Bow was refused admission to the United States as an
alien, and held for deportation. This was an appeal from the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Appeals' discharging the respondent on a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that Chin Bow is not a citizen of the United States. Weedin v.
Chin Bow, 47 Sup. Ct. 772 (U. S. 1927).
A proviso, similar to the one under construction in this case, was included
in the earliest,' and in all subsequent naturalization acts,' but Congress has
left no record of its intention as to the meaning of these words.' Text-writers
and cabinet officers have construed the proviso as requiring that the father's
residence in the United States must have preceded the birth of the child in
'Hardy v. Ouachita Nat. Bank, 165 Ark. 532, 265 S. W. 74 (1924). See
also Potts v. State Bank, 51 Okla. 162, 151 Pac. 859 (1915), where a surety
maker was held not entitled to set up the fraud upon him by the principal
maker in an action by the payee. In Oklahoma it is held that the payee cannot be a holder in due course under the N. I. L.
1IO STAT. 604 (1855), U. S. C. (1925) TIT. VIII c. I §6.
'Weedin v. Chin Bow, 7 F.(2d) 369 (1925).
'An Act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," I STAT. 103,
c. 3 (1790) : " . . . And the children of citizens of the United States, that
may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be
considered as natural-born citizens: Provided, that the right of citizenship
shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the
United States."
' I STAT. 415 (1795); I STAT. 566 (0798); 2 STAT. 153 (1802); 1O
STAT.
604 (i855).
'See ANNALS of FIRST CONGRESS, 11O9, IZIo, et seq. The only reference
to the proviso is at 1125: "Mr. Hartley said that he had another clause ready
to present providing for the children of American citizens born out of the
United States." Nor do the English statutes on which these early acts were
patterned, (1708) 7 Anne c.5 §3; (731) 4 Geo. II C. 21; (i773) 13 Geo. III
C. 21, which provide for the transmission of citizenship to the second generation of foreign-born, aid in the construction of the American statutes. The
English courts have construed their statutes as not transmitting the rights
of citizenship to the issue of the foreign-born grandchildren. See De Geer
v. Stone, 22 Ch. D. 243 (1882); DiCEY, CONFMLCr OF LAWS (i896) 178, 741;
COCKBURN, NATIONALITY (1869) 7 et seq.
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order to make the latter a citizen. The Circuit Court of Appeals based its
judgment' solely on the meaning of the word "descend" as used in the law
of property where the rights of the heir are determined upon the death of the
ancestor,8 and decided that not until Chin Bow's father died, without ever residing in the United States, would the son be deprived of the rights of citizenship. Chief Justice Taft points out, however, that rights of citizenship descend
at birth, both under the rule of jus soli, adopted by the common law,' and under
the statutory rule of jus sanuinis, the latter being derived from the Roman
law. Inasmuch as many countries, including the United States,"' confer citizenship in accordance with both of these rules, it appears that a child, when
born in a foreign country may acquire a sort of dual nationality, one in the
land of his birth jure soli, and the other in the land of his father's birth jure
sanguinis.=

The child is held entitled to the rights of citizenship in both

countries till he reaches majority, when, however, he must elect to become a
citizen in one or the other.' Thus, the rights of citizenship in the two countries are acquired at birth, but the status of citizenship with its attendant duties
is later recognized in only one land. It was argued that an undesirable result
of this decision would be that a citizen who had children before and after residing in the United States would have children who were citizens of different
countries. A similar effect would result from the concurrent operation of the
above rules of nationality, if children in the same family should elect citizenship in different countries.
CONFLICT OF LAwS-ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE-ExTATE
iT RLAL EFFEcT OF DEcma-The appellant, a British subject, went through a form of

marriage, in France with an Austrian subject, the two residing thereafter in
Germany as man and wife. The respondent claimed the movable property of
the appellant in Scotland, on the ground that she had become an Austrian national by her marriage. In defense, the appellant offered a decree of nullity
of her marriage, granted by a German court of competent jurisdiction, on tie
'BoRcHARD,

DIPLOMATIC PROrEcroN OF CmzENs ABRoAD (I915)

6o8;
34; Special Consular
Instructions of the State Department, No. 340, July 27, 1914. See 13 OP.
ATrys. GEN. 90 (1869); U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, i6g U. S. 649, 674, 714
(1898).
"Followed in Johnson v. Sullivan, 8 F.(2d) 988 (1925).
SSee Wood v. Bullard, 151 Mass. 324, 335, 25 N. E. 67, 71 (189o) ; Potts
VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES (1904)

v. Kline, 174 Pa. 513, 514, 34 Atl. 19I,
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(1896).

'U.. S. v. Wong Kim Ark. supra note 6, at 649; Binney, The Arienigenw
of the United States (1854) 2 AM. LAw REc,. 193.
"0The United States applies jus soli by U. S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT
XIV, § i. The statutes supra notes I, 3 and 4, have all provided for the transmission of citizenship jure sanguinis. Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, France,
Great Britain, Holland, Italy, and Mexico, have all adopted the rules of jus
soli and of jus sanguinis in some form or other.
'BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 575; VAN DYNE, op. cit. supra note
6, at 25 et seq.; 3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw DIGEST (1906) §§426-430.
'The United States requires this election by 34 STAT. 1229 (1907), U. S.
C. (1925) TIT. VIII c. i § 6.
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ground that certain formalities required by the law of France had not been
complied with. Held, that the decree of nullity granted by the German court,
as the court of domicil of the parties, should have been recognized by the
Scottish court. Salvesen or Van Lorang v. The Administrator of Austrian
Property, [1927] A. C. 641.
This is the first time that the House of Lords has adjudicated the question of the extraterritorial effect to be given to a decree of nullity of a
marriage, granted by a court of another country, in which the parties were
domiciled, but not in which the marriage was celebrated. It had already been
definitely settled both in England' and the United States 2 that a decree of
divorce granted by a competent court of the state in which both parties are
domiciled will be granted validity in other states. The main issue before the
House of Lords in this case was whether a decree of nullity, like a decree of
divorce, was a decree determining status, thus vesting jurisdiction over the
subject matter in the court of domicil of the parties. It was decided that
celibacy just as much as the state- of being married or divorced was a status,
and hence the jurisdiction to annul a marriage rests in the court of domicil
of the parties.! This seems to be the only view that the court could have
logically taken. It considers decrees of divorce and nullity in exactly the
same manner when the question is one of extraterritorial recognition. There
remains, however, the important distinction in the law applied, viz., that in actions for divorce, the law of the divorce forum is applied," while in actions for
annulment, the law applied is the lex celebrationis of the marriage contract.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICn POWER-STATUTE PRaOHiITING THE VEND-

rxG oF DauGs IN THEIR ORIGINAL PACKAGES ExcEPT By RGisEmm PHARmACISTs-An information was filed against the defendant for permitting an employee who was not a registered pharmacist to sell patent medicines and other
remedial compounds, prepared by others than the vendor, in their original
packages, in violation of a statute' which prohibited the sale of drugs, medicines and poisons except by, or under the supervision of, a registered pharmacist. The defendant's demurrer, on the ground of unconstitutionality, was sustained and the state appealed. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional.
State v. Childs, 257 Pac. 366 (Ariz. 1927).
'Wilson v. Wilson, L. P_ 2 P. & D. 435 (1872); Bater v. Bater, [i9o6]
P. 209; Mitford v. Mitford, [1923] P. 130.
'This result is accomplished as between the various states of the United
States by "the full faith and credit" clause of the U. S. CosTriruvIoN, ART.
IV, § I. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (igoo); Harding v. Harding, i98 U. S. 317 (904) ; Arrington v. Arrington, 127 N. C. 19o, 37 S. E.
212 (1900); STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) 3o8 (a).
'Mitford v. Mitford, supra note i; WESTLAI., PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW (7th ed. 1925), 96. See Note (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 738.
"Wilson v. Wilson, supra note I; MINOR, CONrI.iCT OF LAW (1901) § 78.
'STORY, Co-NFucT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) 115. Also see 2 KENT'S CoMMENTARIES (12th ed. 1873) 458.
'ARIZ. REv.

STAT.

(913)

par. 4805.
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This decision does not deny the general rule that the regulation of business, where such regulation tends to protect public health, is a valid exercise
of the police power 2 It holds that a statute which prohibits certain persons
from selling remedial compounds, in their original packages, which were prepared by persons other than the vendors, whether these compounds are patent
medicines or not, does not protect public health, but merely grants special
privileges to one class, and so is discriminatory and unconstitutional! This
rule is generally applied to patent medicines, either by expressly exempting
them from the scope of statutes regulating the sale of drugs, medicines and
poisons,' as is done in Pennsylvania, or by judicial construction of the statute as exempting them,' or by judicial decision declaring the statute unconstitutional.i But, except for the principal case, courts have held that statutes
forbidding the sale of these other remedial compounds, in their original packages, except by registered pharmacists, are not discriminatory.8 The reason
for the rule exempting patent medicines from the scope of these regulatory
statutes is that since such compounds endanger public health only in their
method of preparation, and not .at all in their sale, it is no protection to public health to limit their sale except by certain persons
It is submitted that
this reason applies as forcefully to these other remedial compounds, sold by
persons other than their manufacturers, in their original packages, as it does
to patent medicines, and that a statute which prohibits the vending of these
compounds, except by registered pharmacists, is, as was held in the principal
case, discriminatory and unconstitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SEPARATION OF POWERS-JURSDICrIoN OF A FEDERAL COURT TO DETERMINE THE LIF OF A SENATE CommITT-The United

States Senate passed a resolution' empowering a special committee to inves2

Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 (1894);
313 (i8go); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623
TIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POICE POWER
'CONSTITUTION
OF ARIZONA, art. 4, § i9,
'N.
Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS (2d ed. 1917)
(Shannon, Supp. 1926) § 3635. See State v.

Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S.
(1887); TIEDEMANN, CONSTITU(i886) § 89.
par. "I3.
c. 45, § 239, TENN. ANN. CODE
Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 8i, 42

N. W. 781, 783 (1889).
'Act of 1887, P. L. 189, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 9315.
"Kentucky Board of Pharmacy v. Cassidy, 115 Ky. 69o, 74 S. W. 73o
(1903) ; State v. Donaldson, supra note 4.
"Noel v. People, 187 .111. 587, 58 N. E. 66 (igoo).
State Board of Pharmacy v. Matthews, 197 N. Y. 353, 90 N. E. 966
(i9.o) '(where it was held that a statute forbidding the sale of tincture of
arnica, one of the compounds in question in the principal case, except by a
registered pharmacist, was not discriminatory); People v. Abraham, I6 App.
Div. 58, 44 N. Y. Supp. 077 (1897); State v. Foutch, 295 S. W. 469 (Tenn.
1927)
(where it was held that a statute forbidding the sale, except by a
registered pharmacist, of tincture of iodine, a similar compound, was not
discriminatory. This case was decided three days after the principal case).
'Noel v. People, mtpra note 7; Kentucky Board of Pharmacy v. Cassidy,
supra note 6; State v. Donaldson, supra note 4.
Senate Resolution 324, 69 th Congress, 2nd session.
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tigate the November, 1926, senatorial elections in Pennsylvania. The committee
was empowered, among other things, to take the ballot-boxes. The resolution
was silent as to the term of the committee. The Senate adjourned March 4,
The respondents, the
1927, but the committee continued its investigations.
legal custodians of the ballot-boxes for Delaware County, refused to deliver
the ballot-boxes to the committee. A bill in equity was brought in the United
States District Court to compel delivery. On a motion to dismiss the bill.
Held, that equity did not have jurisdiction to compel delivery. Reed v. Cominissioners of Delaware County, 21 F.(2d) 144 (D. C. E. D. Pa. i927) .
The judicial code' gives the district courts jurisdiction in suits in equity
brought by officers of the United States. Objection was raised here that the
petitioners were not competent to sue because they no longer constituted a
committee of the Senate. The court said that if it were to determine the
status of the committee it would be performing a duty of the Senate, under
its constitutional power to determine the rules of its proceedings.' So the
court declined jurisdiction on the ground that any decree by it would lack the
finality essential to a valid decree.' The court surmises that if the Senate
were in session, it would never have occurred to the petitioners to apply to
the courts for aid, but that they would have applied to the Senate itself
for relief, as was done in McGrain v. Daugherty. It is suggested that the
court might have said that it could not perform a legislative function, and
could thereby have settled the question without saying that its decree would
lack finality.' The ultimate question of the finality of the decree is not in
the Senate, even though the effect of the decree, or a point in issue might
be substantially overruled by the Senate. The decree itself would stand until
some court had modified it or overruled it. An examination of the authorities shows that the case decides a novel point.
'Senator Reed of Missouri proposed Resolution 364, to continue 324 in
force until Dec. 30, 1927. The resolution was not passed.
'This case was affirmed on November 9, 1927 by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third District.
'36 STAT. 1091 (1911), U. S. C. (1925) TnT. XXVIII, §4I, (1).
'U. S. CoxsTrruTIoN, ART. 1, § 5.
'District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U. S. 62 (igoi) at 64, "As no judgment now rendered would have the sanction that attends the exercise of judicial power, in its legal or constitutional sense, the present appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction . . . " Also see U. S. v. Evans, 21J U. S.
297 (1908) ; Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
7273 U. S. 135 (1927). There the Senate itself acted, authorizing the
arrest of petitioner, who refused to testify before a committee. The case
got into the courts on habeas corpus, which gave the courts jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the arrest. For a full discussion of the principles
involved see: (927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 566; (I926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv.
691, 780; (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 61.
'WLLIAms, FEDRAL. PRAcrcE (2d ed. 1927) 6: "The general theory of
the Constitution was that the great powers of government are divided into
three separate, distinct and independent departments; .
. . and that except
as otherwise provided in that instrument, none of these departments can be
vested with any functions properly belonging to either of the others. According to this theory no court of the United States, as such, can be burdened
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CoNTEMPT-CRITICIST OF DECIDED CASES AS CoNTEMPr-Defendants, as
superintendent and trustee respectively of the Anti-Saloon League, published
a report criticising decisions of the Supreme Court of Indiana in liquor cases.
The report intimated, inter alia, that the court "split judicial hairs" to release
violators of the law. The report also urged the election of judges who are
"dry" and who would carry out the letter and spirit of the law. Held, (two
judges dissenting) that defendants are in contempt of court. State v. Shumaker, i57 N. E. 769 (Ind. 1927).
The rule in the United States, almost without exception, is that a statement derogatory to the judicial character is not a contempt unless it refers
to a case then pending.' Under this rule, a case is held to be pending as long
as it is open for rehearing ' or while the court may modify the opinion 3 The
English rule, which is that of the common law, does not confine contemptuous
publications to those which relate to pending cases but holds that any publication tending to lower public respect for the courts is a contempt.4 The
English view is adopted by a minority of American jurisdictions,' . and there
are dicta to the same effect in cases where the publication referred to a pending action.! In the principal case, one of the cases which was criticized was
pending subject to a rehearing. The remarks about that case, standing alone,
do not appear to be contemptuous ' and the decision seems to rest on the
with, or perform purely executive duties. . . . Neither can any court be
endowed with, or assume any portion of the legislative power . . . " The

United States courts have steadily adhered to this rule. Hayburn's Case, 2
Dall. 4o9 (U. S. 1792) ; U. S. v. Todd, I3 How.

52

(U. S. 1794) (not reported

until 185i) ; U. S. v. Evans, supra note 6; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S.
575 (1875) ; Meriweather v. Garrett, io2 U. S.472 (i88o) ; Ex parte Riebeling, 7o Fed. 30 (D. C. W. D. Texas 1895).

'Cheadle v. State, no Ind. 3oi, ii N. E. 426 (1886); State v. Eau
Claire County Circuit Court, 97 Wis. I, 72 N. W. 193 (1897). See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 463 (907).

Pennsylvania cases on contempt

by publication outside of court are not common [Respublica v. Oswald, i Dall.
319 (Pa. 1788) ; Bayard & Petit v. Passmore, 3 Yates 438, 44i (Pa. 18o2)],
a condition doubtless brought about by the Act of 1836, P. L. 784, §,26; PA.
STAT. (West, 1920) § 5487: "No publication, out of court, respecting the conduct of judges, officers of the court, jurors, witnesses, parties or any of them,
of, in or concerning any cause depending in such court, shall be construed into
a contempt of the said court, so as to render the author, printer, publisher, or
either of them, liable to attachment and summary punishment for the same."
'People v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 Pac. 912 (i9o6)
(appeal dismissed in Patterson v. Colorado, supra note i).
' In re Chadwick, IO9 Mich. 588, 67 N. W. io7i (1896); State v. Tugwell, i9Wash. 238, 52 Pac. io56 (i898).
'Queen v. Gray [9oo] 2 Q. B. 36. But see McLeod v. St. Aubyn 68
L. J. P. C. (N. s.) 137, 143 (1899).

'State v. Morrill, i6 Ark. 384 (i855); Burdett v. Commonwealth, 103
82 Vt. 382, 74 Atl. 71 (io9).

Va. 838, 48 S. E. 878 (904) ; State v. Hildreth,
See Note, 68 L. R. A. 251 (905).

"In re Chadwick, supra note 3; State v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S.W.
79 (903).
"Defendants stated that the rule adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court
differed from that followed by the federal courts.
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broad ground that the publication, taken as a whole, contained derogatory matter and a veiled threat with respect to a large group of cases pending before
the court. As stated in the dissenting opinion: "The majority opinion also
seems to make the point . . . that because there were, at the time of respondents' criticism, other cases pending in this court in which were involved
legal questions similar to the questions decided in the criticized cases, that
the court could therefore proceed as though the criticism was of pending cases.
No case has been, cited in support of such a theory." It will be seen, therefore, that the principal case occupies a middle ground between the United
States and the English views.
CoNTRAcrs-REscxssioN-WAivFR OF RIGHT TO Rf-sciND-Defendant constiuction company sublet to plaintiff its contract to build a tunnel for defendant railroad. The subcontract, incorporating the terms of the principal contract, provided for payment at a named price per linear foot of tunnel. The
specifications included the statement that the excavation was "expected to
be'" in solid rock. Early in the work plaintiff encountered a formation of
loose sand, which proved continuous and made the original plans for the tunnel
impracticable. The plaintiff, dealing directly with the railroad, obtained new
specifications, requiring much more extensive excavating. Plaintiff completed
the work under these specifications, not notifying the railroad of a claim for
extra pay until a short time before completion. On completion both the plaintiff and the principal contractor were fully paid at the contract rate. This
is an action for extra pay against both the contractor and the railroad. Held,
(i)that the subcontractor can recover reasonable cost of the extra work from
the railroad, and (2) that he cannot recover from the contractor. Sdrtoris
v. Utah Construction Co., 21 F.(2d) i (C. C. A. 9th, 192),'

The rule is generally stated that when a person. is induced by misrepresentation to assent to something which he would not have done but for the
misrepresentation the contract is merely voidable by the injured party, and not
void,1 .e., though rescission' is permissible, the party wishing to, avail himself of this right must manifest in some way his election to avoid it.' If he
does nothing, or proceeds with the work, he ratifies the contract and is bound
by it.' So in the instant case the question of whether there was misrepre13 WILU.STox, COxTRAcTs (1920)
§§253, 254.

§ 1488; BowER, LAW

OF AcrozxBLE
When a person is induced, however,
to believe that the contract which he makes is something other than it actually
is, the contract is void. WL.ISToN, loc. cit. supra.
"'Rescission" is here used not in its primary sense of a mutual agreement, but in its secondary sense of an election by the party injured by a breach
to treat the contract as terminated. 5 PAGF, "CONTRACTS (2d ed. 192o)
§ 3027.
, Conway v. White, 2 F. (2d) at 871 (C. C. A. 2d, I925) ; 3 WnLisToN,
op. cit. supra § 1469. It is also said that one who wishes to rescind must
manifest his election to do so without undue delay. Hennessy v. Bacon, 137
MSISRESFNTATION (1911)

U. S. 78 (I890).

'Monad Engineering Co. v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. I79 (1918) ; Hawkins
v. United States, 96 U. S. 689 (1877).
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sentation' or unexpected difficulty and material alteration of plans' sufficient
to warrant rescission is unimportant because the plaintiff did not in fact rescind. Thus bound by the original express contract, and without right to damages on it' (because even if there was misrepresentation it was an innocent
one), it cannot logically be said that any work was extra or that extra pay
was contemplated so as to raise an implied contract. either with the principal
contractor' or the railroad. It is submitted that the court departed undesirably from settled law in holding the failure to rescind immaterial and allowing recovery on implied contract. If sympathy should be shown to the plaintiff in his hard position, it would have been better to stretch the law in the
direction in which there is an existing trend,"0 and permit recovery on the contract because of the innocent misrepresentation. If the latter were done the
recovery from the railroad instead of the principal contractor, who should be
primarily liable, could probable be justified on the ground of avoiding circuity of action."
Did the statement, "is expected to be in solid rock," amount to a representation (warranty) ? It is universally stated that mere belief, expectation, or opinion stated as such is not a representation except as to the sincerity of the belief. BowER, op. cit. supra § 33. But see Spearin v. United
States, 248 U. S. 132 (ii8).
'The classic view that unforeseen difficulties not amounting to impossibility are no excuse for non-performance when one contracts absolutely to
perform an entire work for a whole sum, Rowe v. Town of Peabody, 207
Mass. 226, 93 N. E. 604 (1911), has been slightly modified by some courts.

Kinzer Construction Co. v. State, 125 N. Y. Supp. 46 (191o).

"Though rescission may be granted for any misrepresentation whether
innocent or fraudulent, no action will lie for damages until fraud is established. BowER, op. cit. supra §§ 190, 191, 254. Though recognizing the rule,
Bower, ibid. §472, says "it is difficult to discover any good reason for it;"
and Williston, 3 op. cit. supra §§ 1501-1510, is of the opinion that the "absolutely illogical" established English doctrine in deceit, estopped, and warranty
has become "nearly, if not quite, impossible." Williston goes on to show that
breaks have already been made from the old rule by holding agents liable
for honest misrepresentations as to their authority, and sellers for similar
misrepresentations as to title and quality of goods made in order to induce a
sale.
8An express contract excludes an implied contract. 3 PAGE, op. cit. supra
§§ 1438, 1441. Mutual assent is just as essential to an implied as to an express contract. -Ibid. §§ 1436, 1461.
'Morrison v. Jones, 6 Ill. App. 89 (i88O).
"See supra note 7.
'Ordinarily a subcontractor cannot recover directly from the owner, with
whom he is not in privity. HUDSON, BUILDING CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1926) 526,
533 (M (g). But such recovery has sometimes been allowed in equity to
prevent circuity of action. Riddle Co. v. Mandeville and Jamesson, 5 Cranch
322 (U. S. 18o9).
And the CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1923)
§379 (the instant case was tried in California) provides that "Any person
may be made a defendant who . . . is a necessary party to a complete de-

termination or settlement of the question involved therein."

RECENT CASES
defendants were inIiAI. LAW-JURSDICTO1T-CONsPmAcY-The
C
dicted for conspiring to violate the Prohibition Act "at the Bay of San Francisco." The defendants' ship had been hovering off San Francisco, beyond the
three-mile limit, and from there discharging its cargo into small boats which
ran it into the harbor. The ship, crew and cargo were seized by virtue of a
On trial in the United States District Court, the
treaty with Great Britain
defendants moved for a directed verdict of not guilty on the ground that the
United States had no jurisdiction, since they had never been within its territorial limits. The refusal to so direct was one of the objections urged on
certiorari to the Supreme Court. Held, that the United States has jurisdiction, since overt acts were committed by co-conspirators in the United States.
Ford v. U. S., 47 Sup. Ct 53i (U. S. 1g7).
At common law no overt act fs necessary to constitute the crime of conspiracy But under federal statute some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy is a necessary element to any offense against the United StatesO A
long line of decisions has held that thereby another element has not been
added to the crime, but only that Congress has seen fit to afford a locus poenitentiae to those involved. But in Hyde v. U. S.,' the Supreme Court in a five
to four decision said, "It seems like a contradiction to say that a thing is necessary to complete another thing, and yet that the other thing is complete without it. . . . The overt act is something more, therefore, than evidence of
the conspiracy." It is submitted that the solution of this problem depends
on which of these views is adopted. If the overt act is in reality a part of
the crime of conspiracy under federal law, then the case is similar to those
where a person in one jurisdiction puts a force in motion which completes a
crime in another jurisdiction, or where the crime is committed by means of an
innocent agent, the decision would seem to have some basis. In fact, there
is a suggestion that the instant case rests on that analogy. But if the overt
act is merely the minimum of evidence required and not a substantive part of
the offense, then an act constituting no part of the crime is permitted to draw
jurisdiction to the place where it was done.' The Court cites several cases in
support of the proposition that a conspiracy formed without the jurisdiction
is triable within the jurisdiction if an overt act is committed therein. But as
Treaty of May 22, 1924, 43 STAT. 1761.
v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386 (i85o) ; iz C. J. 55i and cases cited.
'United States v. Rabinowitch, 238 U. S. 78 (1914).
'Bannon v United States, 156 U. S. 464 (1895) ; Dealy v. United States,
152 U. S. 539 (893); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197 (1892);
United States v. Britton, io8 U. S. i!9 (1883); United States v. Hirsch, ioo
U. S. 33 (1879).
'225 U. S. 347, at 359 (1912).
Justice Holmes, dissenting, seems to have
foreseen a situation such as the present for he said at page 389, "If a conspiracy exists wherever an overt act is done in aid of it, the act ought to give
jurisdiction over conspirators in a foreign state, if later they should be caught
in the place where the act was done."
'Sed qucere whether this is a violation of the Sixth Amendment requiring
all criminal prosecutions to be in the district wherein the crime was committed.
2State
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said in Noyes v. State,7 the cases in general go no further than to hold that
the rule operates "where the overt act is done in the same jurisdiction in which
the conspiracy occurred. The principle is one relating to mere venue, and
not to international jurisdiction."8 Other cases cited are cases in which the
principal outside the jurisdiction co-operated with an agent within the jurisdiction or put a force in motion completing a crime within the jurisdiction.9 Only two of the cases, and neither one of these by a Federal court,
are in accord with the doctrine of the principal case ' It would seem that this
is a rather unsatisfactory state of the law, and that "for another jurisdiction,
if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its
notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would
be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly
might resent."'
OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR AS OFFENSE INMORAL TuR rrUDE-The Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, has held

DISBARMENT-MANUFACTURE
VOLVING

that a member of the federal bar who has been convicted of manufacturing
beer in violation of the National Prohibition Act cannot be disbarred on the
ground that he has committed a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Bartos v. United States District Court, i F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
In returning to the strict common law definition of moral turpitude, the instant
case is contrary to the recent decisions of state and federal courts. See Note
(T927) 75 U. OF, PA. L. REV. 357.
INJUNCrION-Dsc.osURE OR USE OF TRADE SECRETS BY A FoRMER EMPLOYEE--The defendants were employed by the plaintiffs as drivers on its
laundry routes. After leaving the plaintiff's employ, the -defendants went into
business for themselves, and solicited orders from the plaintiff's customers
along their former routes. The defendants used no lists, but carried the names
in their memories. The plaintiff brought a bill to enjoin such soliciting. Held,
that the injunction should be granted. Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 138 At. 47
(R. I. 1927).

741 N. J. Law, 418 at 422 (1879).
"Cf. Rex v. Brisac, 4 East. 164 (18o3); Reg. v. Connoly, 25 Ont. .151

(1895) ; Lamar v. United States, 240 U. S. 6o (1916) ; Hyde v. United States,
U. S. 347 (1912) ; Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 (i9o6) ; Benson v. Henkle, I98 U. S. I (905).
'Cf. Stressheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280 (1911) , American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909) ; Com. v. Smith, II Allen 243 (Mass.
I865) ; State v. Piver, 74 Wash. 96, 132 Pac. 858 (913) ; Weil v. Black, 76
W. Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666 (I915).
"' Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 7 S. & R. 469 (Pa. 1822) (where an agent
committed overt acts in Pennsylvania, and it was held that that state should
punish the principal), International Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth, 137 Ky.
668, 126 S. W. 352 (1910) (which gave as a reason for the decision that the
case was similar to that of shooting across a state border).
'Ho!mes, J.. in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., supra note
225

io at 35C.
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Different grounds have been assigned for the exercise of equity's jurisdiction to restrain the use or disclosure of trade secrets by a former employee.1
In some cases it is said that the employer has a valuable property right in
the secret, which 'the remedy at law is inadequate to protect;' in others, that
there is an implied contract not to use it, which is specifically enforceable;"
and in still others, that to use it is a breach of trust or confidence, which
equity will restrain. As applied to the solicitation by the employee of the
former employer's customers, this jurisdiction is generally limited to cases
where the employee makes use of property of the employer, such as lists,' or
copies thereof surreptitiously obtained.' Usually it will not be exercised in
cases where the employee merely carries the names in his memory, for the
reason that in the pursuit of a lawful occupation a man should not be restrained from using the knowledge and experience he has gained in a former
position, when he has appropriated no property of his former employer, and
when the information is such that it could be easily obtained by one not having access to the employer's lists by simply observing the calls made by a
driver.' Those decisions contrary to this rule and in accord with the principal
case are based on the theory that in principle there is no difference between
a written and a memorized list; that in either case it is confidential information, the use of which should be restrained." It is submitted that such decisions lose sight of the fact that equity will generally refuse to protect any
interest other than a property right,' and that the employee's use of his knowledge of the employer's customers can hardly be considered an infringement of
a property right of the employer.
'Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241 (1851).
'Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868); Witkop & Holmes Co. v.
Great A. and P. Tea Co., 6g Misc. go, 124 N. Y. Supp. 956 (igio).
'Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N. J. Eq. 293, 78 At. 698 (igio);
Macbeth Co. v. Schnelback, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688 (913); Stevens v. Stiles,
29 R. I. 399, 71 Atl. 8o2 (i9o9).
"Lamb v. Evans, [1893] i Ch. 218; Steel Car Co. v. Steel Car Co., 210
Pa. 464, 60 Adt. 4 (1904).
'Measures Bros. v.'Measures, [igio] t Ch. 336; Witkop & Holmes Co.
v. Boyce, 61 Misc 126, 112 N. Y. Supp. 874 (i9o8).
"Robb v. Green, [i895] 2 Q. B. i; Grand Union Tea Co. v. Dodds, 164
Mich. 5o, 128 N. W. iogo (i9io).
. "El Dorado Laundry Co. v. Ford, 294 S. W. 393 (Ark. 1927); Garst v.
Scott, 114 Kan. 676, 220 Pac. 277 (1923); Federal Laundry Co. v. Zimmerman, 218 Mich. 211, 187 N. W. 335 (922); Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial
Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715, 132 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1911).
'New Method Laundry Co. v. McCann, i74 Cal. 26, 161 Pac. 990 (916);
French Bros. Co. v. Milk Co., 21 Ohio App. 177, 152 N. E. 675 (925) ; Davis
& Co. v. Miller, io4 Wash. 444, 177 Pac. 323 (1918).
'Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 AtI. 542 (896); Owen v. Partridge, 40 Misc. 495, 82 N. Y. Supp. 248 (903) ; Ashinsky v. Levenson, 256 Pa.
14, IOO Atl. 491 (917).
"The employer can always protect himself, because equity will specifically
enforce a reasonable contract not to compete. Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 241
Mass. 468, 135 N. E. 568 (1922); American Ice Co. v. Lynch, 74 N. J. Eq.
298, 70 Atl. 138 (19o8) ; McCall Co. v. Wright, 198 N. Y. 143, 91 N. E. 516
(Igio).
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PARDONING POWER-POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO COMMUTE SENTENCES
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE PRISONFR-The prisoner was convicted of

first degree murder and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment by President Taft in i909. Petitions for pardon in 1918 and
1921 being refused, the prisoner applied for a writ of habeas corpus in 1925,
on the ground that his removal to a penitentiary and the President's order

were without his consent and without legal authority. Held, that the President
has the power to commute the sentence from death to life imprisonment without the prisoner's consent. Biddle v. Perovich, 47 Sup. Ct. 664 (U. S. 1927).
Under the Constitution of the United States ' "The President . . . shall

have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United
States, except in Cases of Impeachment." The cases clearly establish the
proposition that this constitutional grant includes the power to commute punishments and grant conditional pardons.? The problem, therefore, is to ascertain whether a prisoner's consent is necessary to make a pardon effective. The
heretofore leading United States-case" clearly decides that a pardon must be
accepted in order to be effective, on the theory that it is similar to a deed,
and therefore requires a delivery and acceptance. Justice Holmes, on the
other hand, reasons that the granting of a pardon is determined by a consideration of the public welfare, and the consent of the prisoner, as in all punishment for crimes, is immaterial.' A contrary conclusion, he aptly indicates,
would deprive the President of the power specifically conferred on him by the
Constitution, even in a case where the public welfare demanded the exercise
of the power. This reasoning undoubtedly establishes a new rule for the
interpretation of this clause of the Constitution, and indicates a return to the
ancient English conception of the pardoning power.' While the opinion expressed in the principal case is submitted as -the better view, it would seem
that the creation of this new rule, superseding an established principle, might
have been unnecessary to reach the same conclusion, for in the petitioner's passive acquiescence in the terms of the pardon for sixteen years, the court would
have had no difficulty in finding an implied consent.
Article II, Section 2.
'Ex parte Wells, I8 How. 3o7 (U. S. 1855); Ex parte Harlan, i8o Fed.
ii

(C. C. N. D. Fla. 1909) ; aff'd, 218 U. S. 442 (I9IO).
'U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Peters 150 (1833).
Marshall, C. . stated that "A

pardon is a private, though official act of the executive magistrate . . . A
pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery
is not complete without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person
to whom it is tendered, and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in
a court to force it on him." Cited and followed in Burdick v. United States,
236 U. S. 79 (1914) ; Curtin v. United States, 236 U. S. 96 (914).
'In the principal case at page 665 he says, "A pardon in our days is not
a private act of grace

.

.

.

When granted it is the determination of the

ultimate authority that the public welfare will better be served by inflicting less
than what the judgment fixed. Just as the original punishment would be
imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will,
whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines
what shall be done."
'JENKINS,
EIGHT CENTURIES OF REPORTS (2d ed. 1734), Case 62 (1468)
states: "If the King pardons a Felon, and it is shewn to the Court; and yet
the Felon pleads not guilty, and waives the Pardon, he shall not be hanged;
for it is the King's Will that he shall not; and the King has an interest in
the Life c. his Subject." See also 4 BL. Co.NI.* 397-402.
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QUIETING TITLE-WHERE THE ALLEGED CLOUD IS IN THE PLAINTIFF'S
LEAsE-Lessee holds under 99 and 198 year leases, executed in 1887, covering
ground on which the Chicago Auditorium Building is erected. Clauses in the
leases call for the erection of a building, specifying materials and type of construction common in 1887. The present building is unsuitable for modem use
because of changes in neighborhood, and its revenue does not sufficiently protect the lessees investment. Lessors contend that the present building cannot
be removed and a larger, modern one erected without violating the clauses
in the leases. Lessee brought a bill to remove this cloud on its title. On appeal from a decree dismissing the bill.
Held, that equity has jurisdiction to
remove the cloud. Chicago Auditorium Association v. Willing, 20 F. (2d)
837 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
The lessors argued that whatever adverse claim or cloud was alleged to
exist grew out of the very instrument which constituted the basis of the lessee's
title, and being in the same instrument, it was not such a cloud as equity will
remove. There are cases to support this contention 1 It is evident that the
lessee is seeking affirmative relief from hardship, a request not often granted
by the courts
Any attempt to have annulled as a cloud upon title an agreement which entered into the consideration for a lease is unusual, and it would
seem that the lessee should be placed in no better position than anyone holding
a poor bargain. However, the court could see no justification for the lessors'
contention, reasoning that although removable clouds usually appear in some
instrument dehors the complainant's chain of title, yet the basis for equity
jurisdiction in removing clouds is not determined by the character of the
written document creating the cloud, but is founded on the public interest in
the quieting of titles. Two cases, which the court thinks deserve special attention, are the only judicial precedents for the decision.
The decision is an
advanced one, and illustrates the willingness of courts of equity to adjust
their remedies to the changing demands of our economic growth
'Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 Wall. 547 (U. S. 1872); Louisville Co.
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 234 U. S. 369 (1914) ; First Congregational
Church v. Page, 257 Ill. 472, ioo N. E. 975 (1913); Parker v. Shannon, 121
Ill. 452, 13 N. E. I55 (1 7).
See Note (19o8) 8 COL. L. REV. 322; (1909) 9 ibid. 68. Cf. Esham
v. Lamar, L. R. 14 Eq. 522 (1849).
'Shell v. Martin, i9 Ark. 139 (1857); Hager v. Shindler, 29 Cal. 47
(1865) ; Eckman v. Eckman, 55 Pa. 269 at 273 (1867). Relief is granted on
principle of quia tinet, that the instrument or proceeding constituting the cloud
may be so used as to injuriously or vexatiously embarrass or affect a complainant's title. The jurisdiction of equity to remove clouds from title is well
settled being founded on the -administration of protective and preventive justice. 4
McArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 1O9 N. E. 162 (1915);
Rector v. Rector, 201 N. Y. I, 94 N. E. 191 (1911).
See Note (19o9) 9
COL L. REv. 257; (19o6) 22 HARV. L. REv. 543.
"It is impossible to lay down rules which will cover all the cases in which
a court of equity will interpose its jurisdiction to remove a cloud upon the title
to real estate. This jurisdiction does not rest upon any arbitrary rules, but depends upon the facts of each case." Fonda v. Sage, 48 N. Y. 173, 179 (1872).
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TAXATION-CAPITAL STOCK TAX ON A CORPORATION ORGANIZED TO AD1
MINISTER AN EsTATE-Under a federal statute every corporation carrying on

or doing business is subject to a special tax on its capital stock. Plaintiff
was a corporation, organized by the heirs of a decedent, for the purpose of
holding the assets of the decedent's estate until an advantageous opportunity
for liquidation presented itself. The activities of the corporation consisted
solely in making loans to the heirs or stockholders, the company never having
attempted to deal in securities nor to distribute the income or assets of the
estate. Plaintiff paid the tax for a number of years, and now brings this
suit to recover the amount paid to the government, claiming the corporation
was not doing business within the meaning of the statute. Held, that plaintiff
was doing business, and consequently could not recover the amount of the tax.
Conhaim Holding Co. v. Willcuts, 21 F. (2d) 91 (D. C. Minn. 1927).
Under statutes similar to the present one, it has been decided that the tax
is levied, not on the business which the corporation might have done under its
franchise, but on the business actually done Thus the courts have held that
a corporation was not liable if it had reduced its activities and abandoned
its original purpose, either by altering some of the terms of its charter' or
by other means clearly indicating the change in its policy,' and had become
the mere nominal owner and holder of property, with the necessary duties
thereto.' Likewise it has been decided that even if a corporation was engaged
in the precise activity for which it was organized, yet that activity might not
constitute the doing of business. Thus a corporation which existed as the
bare intermediary of another, its activities consisting merely in the leasing
of property and the distribution of rentals, was not liable under the statute.'
The results in the two lines of decisions discussed above were possible because
the courts took the ground that "doing business" conveyed the idea of continuity and progression in commercial enterprises,7 and that the tax was levied
on the doing of successive business acts. However, the majority of cases
which recently have been litigated are in accord with the principal case,' due
to the changing legal interpretation of the phrase "doing business." It is now
generally agreed that if a corporation is continuing the body and substance
of the purpose for which it was organized, and is existing for the pursuit of
profit and gain, not for charitable or eleemosynary purposes, its activities
143

STAT.

325 (1924) ; U. S. C. (1925) TIT. XXVI, § 223, par. I.

'McCoach v. Mine Hill & Schuylkill Haven R. R.,
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Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 22o U. S. io7, at 145 (19io).

U. S.

295 (1913);

3
Maxwell v. Abrast Realty Co., 218 Fed. 457 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1914); Zonne
v. Minneapolis Syndicate Co., 220 U. S. 187 (911).
'McCoach v. Mine Hill, etc., supra note 2.
'United States v. Nipissing Mines Co., 206 Fed. 431 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1913).
'United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28 (1914).
'See Note (1925) 73 U. PA. L. REV. 181.
'Lewellyn v. Pittsburg, etc. R. R., 222 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1915);
U. S. v. Emery, supra note 6.
'See U. PA. L. REv., supra note 7, at note 14.
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constitute the doing of business. ' Though the facts of the present case have
not previously been passed upon by a court, by applying the modern rule as
the test, the logical conclusion seems to have been reached. The heirs of the
decedent were enjoying the advantage of holding the estate in a corporate form,
and were in the meantime fulfilling the very purpose for which they were
itcorporated, hence, ipso facto, their liability under the statute is effected. A
recent case to the contrary is Arunally Investment Co. v.Rose," in which the
members of a family formed a corporation to hold the proceeds received from
the sale of a business, and issued loans to themselves as stockholders. The
principal case criticises the Nunally case for holding that such a corporation
was not doing business within the meaning of the statute.
TAXATION-STATE FRANcrIsE TAX ON THE LEssso OF AN INTERSTATE
CAaiERu-The defendant, incorporated in Tennessee, owned and maintained an

interstate bridge across the Mississippi River, leasing it to three interstate carriers. The state of Arkansas assessed a franchise tax on the defendant, based
on that amount of its capital stock which was operating in Arkansas, but the
defendant refused to pay it on the ground that it was engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce. Held, that the tax was valid, since the mere ownership, maintenance, and leasing of an interstate bridge is not interstate commerce. Arkansas and Memphis Railway Bridge and Terminal Co. v. State,
295 S. W. 378 (Ark 1927).
Commerce "embraces commercial intercourse in all its branches, includ'
ing the transportation of passengers and property by common carriers."
Within this definition, it has been held that a bridge over a river separating
two states is an instrument of interstate commerce,' in exactly the same sense
as is a ferryboat operating between the states. It is also well settled that
the state may not exact a tax for the privilege of operating such an instrument, since the tax would be a burden on interstate commerce.' The instant
case is distinguished in that the corporation merely owned and maintained the
instrument, leasing it entirely to interstate carriers-. But it would appear that,
under the broad definition of commerce, such lessors are engaged in interstate
commerce as much as the lessee carriers. This principle has been recognized
"Edwards v. Chile Copper Co., 270 U. S. 452 (1925); Traction Cos. v.
Collectors of Internal Revenue, 223 Fed. 984 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915); Von Bonlbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 5o3, at 516 (1916).
114 F. (2d) 189 (D. C. Ga. 1926).
1

1n re Second Employers Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I, 46 (191I)
; Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,189 (U. S. 1824).
2 Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204 (1893);
Bridge Co. v. Cobb, io8 Okla. 21, 233 Pac. 463 (1925).
Burkburnett
3
Charles River Bridge v. Warren, Ii Pet. 42o, 62o (U. S. 1837). See
Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v.Kentucky, supra note 2, at 218.
'Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. i96 (1884); Moran
v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69 (1884); Helena-Glendale Ferry Co. v. State,
1oi Miss. 65, 57 So. 362 (1911).
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at various times with reference to the owners of terminal facilities, who had
leased them to interstate railroads.' It is submitted that the court in the instant case could have sustained the tax on better authority and reason. For
such taxes have been upheld, when levied with reference to the corporation's
property within the state, on the ground that they are taxes on its intangible
property there situated, and as such, are valid.'
TRUSTS-SPENDTHrIFr

TRUSTs-ATTACHMENT

BY WIFE

OF INCOME

IN

HANDS OF TRuSTEs-Testatrix created by her will a trust in favor of her
grandson.

In 19o3 the grandson married.

In i9o5, three years before testa-

trix's death, she added the following restrictive codicil to her will: "I will and
direct that neither the income payable to my grandson William H. Watt nor
corpus from which the same is derived shall be liable to or for the contracts
ox debts of said William H. Watt, or to execution or to attachment of his
creditors; but shall be absolutely free from the same and he shall have no
power to sell, assign, encumber the same or any part thereof, or in any way
anticipate said income." 1 Some years later the grandson deserted his wife.
Subsequently she obtained a court order for support, on which nothing 'has
been paid. The wife petitioned the court that the trustees be required to pay
her reasonable support out of the income in their hands payable to her husband. Held, that the wife may attach in the hands of the trustees a sum sufficient for her support. Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542 (927).
The principal case marks a complete change in the Pennsylvania doctrine
of spendthrift trusts by allowing a wife to reach income in the hands of
trustees on a court's decree for support.2 Pennsylvania was the first jurisdiction to recognize this type of trust and has heretofore consistently upheld
them in their entirety.3 The reactionary step here taken was based on two
grounds: In the first place the court held that the total absence of any mention of the wife in the codicil (executed subsequent to grandson's marriage)
evinced an intent not to exclude her from the benefits of the trust. This runs
contrary to the accepted rules that the intent must be ascertained within the
'United States v. Union Stock Yard, 226 U. S. 286 (1912) (where it was
held that the lessor of the property was still subject to the provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act) ; Spaw v. Terminal Ry. Co., I98 Mo. App. 552, 201
S. W. 927 (1917)

(where it was held that the lessor was liable to an in-

jured employe under the Federal Employers Liability Act). The court in the
latter case said, at 556, "As the terminal railway tracks and facilities were
used and necessary in the transportation of persons and property by the 'trunk
line railroads' . . . , the said defendant terminal railroad was engaged in

interstate commerce."

6Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150 (897);
St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350 (1914); Pullman's Car
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (I89O).

This codicil was held to create a valid spendthrift trust in Moorehead's
Estate,Cf.27Thackara
D. R. I5v. Mintzer,
(Pa. I918).
ioo Pa. i5i (1882) ; Board of Charities v. Lockard, 198 Pa. 572, 48 Atl. 496 (i9oi) ; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 Pa. Super.
275 (ii6).
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four corners of the will.' unless uncertainty, ambiguity, or inconsistency appear
in the language.' It is submitted that it is difficult to find the above qualities
in the language used in testatrix's will. Further, the court argued, if the testatrix intended to exclude the wife the trust would be invalid, because contravening principles of morality. That an intention which does in fact violate
public policy and outrage social decency is void and illegal, represents an
established rule of law.' On the other hand, Pennsylvania has never before discovered that trust income put beyond the reach of wife and children by restriction did contravene public policy and oppose the mandates of social morality.7 In the second place, the principle is laid down that a support order is not
a debt within testatrix's exemption. However, all money judgments are generally considered to come within the usual meaning of the word debt
On
this precise point Pennsylvania courts have previously held that the wife became one of the husband's creditors by obtaining a decree for support. The
decision is further complicated by the Act of x921 which allows the deserted
wife fifty per cent. of the cestui que trust's income and gives her authority
to attach it in the hands of trustee'
In the opinion the court ignores this
statute entirely, despite the fact that it covers the exact point at issue, and
also despite the fact that it forms the basis of the lower court's opinion decided in favor of the wife.' The case seems to evade the question of the
constitutionality of the statute, although the Superior Court has once upheld

§§ 21425.'GR, RSTANTs ON ALmNATIoN OF PRoPERTY (2d ed. i8g5)
'Ware v. Minot, 2o2 Mass. 512, 88 N. E. iogx (igog); Lytle v. Beveridge, s8 N. Y. 592 (1874); Provenchere's Appeal, 67 Pa. 463 (I87I).
'Missouri Baptist Sanitarium v. McCune, 112 Mo. App. 332, 87 S. W.
93 (I905); Champlin v. Champlin, i Sheld. 355 (N. Y. 1873).
"Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 3oo (887) ; Coverhaven v. Shuler, 2 Paige
12 (N. Y. 1830); Peabody v. Cook, 201 Mass. 218, 87 N. E. 166 (ii9o-).
'See Thackara v. Mintzer, Board of Charities v. Lockard, Commonwealth
v. Thomas, all supra note 2.
"'All money judgments are debts under definitions given of that word in
any of the books." Beatty, J., in Rhodes v. O'Farrel, 2 Nev. 6o, 6z (1866)
holding judgment on tax is a debt. The word debt is defined variously as "an
obligation or legal liability to pay a certain sum," "a sum of money due on
contract or established by judgment," "a liquidated money obligation," "a liquidated demand," etc., 13 CYv. 395-6-7, and cases there cited. "The word debt
is one of large import including debts of record or judgments," BuuMu, LAw
DICTIONARY.

"'It is contended the character of the debt in this case is not within meaning of testator's exemption . . . Whether judgment be for contract or
tort matters not

.

. . as the wife of George has become one of his credi-

tors (by obtaining judgment) and seeks to enforce her claim by adverse process
against the trustee, the debt as well as proceedings come within the prohibitory
clause of the will," Mercur, I., in Thackara v. Mintzer, supra note 2, at 152,
holding income of spendthrift trust protected against attachment by wife based
on judgment for alimony. See also Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra note

2, at 278.

"Act of 1921, P. L. 434, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 9079 a.
"Moorehead's Estate, decided by the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County,

March Term, 1927.
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the measure by way of dictum." There seems no grave
decision reached in the instant case was equitable.'
Yet
adopted rather strained methods to reach this result. It
the relief provided by statute could have been adopted,
have proved more satisfactory and permanent in effect

doubt but that the
the court obviously
is submitted that if
the decision would

WILs-CONSTRUCTIN ---"H
s AND LEGA. REr'RESENTATrIS"---The testatrix made a will in i899 and died in the same year. By the will she devised
all of her real estate in trust for the lives of her son and granddaughter, and
upon the death of either, directed that "such deceased one's share of such
rent and income shall be devoted and applied to such deceased one's heirs and
legal representatives during the life of the survivor." The son died in I922,
leaving a wife but no lineal descendants. Held, (one judge dissenting) that
the widow under the laws as they existed at the time of the death of the
testatrix, was not an heir of her husband's real estate, and therefore did not
participate in the income of the trust. Troxell's Estate, go Pa. Super. 533
(I7).

The expression "legal representatives" when used in regard to things real
means heirs,' therefore the interpretation narrows down to that word. Under
the intestate laws in Pennsylvania prior to the Intestate Act of 1917, a widow
did not acquire a share of her husband's real estate by descent and therefore
did not fall under the description "heirs.''
This Act, among other things,
gives the widow a certain share of her husband's real estate in lieu of dower.'
Under similar statutes in other states, it has been decided that a surviving wife
may with strict regard to the significance of the term, be designated an heir
and take as such.' There are no cases under the Intestate Act of 1917 in Pennsylvania. In this case, the majority opinion was that "heirs" must be interpreted under the intestate laws in force when the testator died, rather than
when the life estate terminated, and that therefore the court was not called
on to interpret the Act of 7917. This principle of construction has not been
passed on before in Pennsylvania. The few cases that there are in other jurisdictions are in sharp conflict. The view of the dissent represents the law in
several jurisdictions,' and is based on the principle that there are no heirs until
Everhart v. Everhart, 87 Pa. Super. 184, 187 (1926).
""Certainly property available for the purposes of pleasure and profit
should be answerable to the demands of justice," Tillingast v. Bradford, 4

R. I.

205, 212

(1858).

S1 n re Bair, 255 Pa. 169, 99 Atl. 471 (I916) ; Bailey v. Smith, 214 Mass.
114, ioi N. E. 62 (1913).
'Lesieur's Estate, 205 Pa. 119, 54 At. 579 (I9O3); Dodge's Appeal, io6
Pa. 216 (1884).
'Act of 1917, P. L. 429, §§ 1-3, PA. STAT. (West, i92o) §§ 8342-8352.
'Perry v. Perry, ho Ky. I6, 6o S. W. 855 (i9oI) ; Olney v. Lovering, 167
Mass.
N. E. 766 (1897) ; In re Shumway's Estate, 194 Mich. 245, i6o
N. W. 446,
595 45(1916).
'Lincoln v. Perry, 149 Mass. 368, 21 N. E. 671 (1889) ; Smith v. Hunter,
86 Ohio St. io6, 99 N. E. 9I (912 ) ; Wolf v. Middleton, I8 R. I. 8IO, 31 AtI.
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the ancestor dies. On the other hand it may well be argued that the majority opinion seems better calculated to effect the intentions of the testator.
This question can only arise in Pennsylvania in connection with wills made
prior to 1924, for it is provided by statute that in wills executed after that
time, "heirs" shall be determined on the basis of the intestate laws in effect
at the termination of the life estate, rather than at the death of the testator,
unless there is a clear provision to the contrary.!
27 (1893). See Lipincott v. Purtell, 98 N. J. Eq. 569, 571, 131 Atl. 210, 212
Cwttra: In re Wilson, 65
(1925).
Cf. Wood's Appeal, 18 Pa. 478 (1852).
Calif. App. 68o, 225 Pac. 283 (1924); Quick's Exec. v. Quick, 21 N. J. Eq.
13 (87o).
See Swenson's Estate, 55 Minn. 300, 56 N. W. 115 (893).
'Act of 1923, P. L. 914, PA. STAT. (West, Supp. 1924) §§ i896ia-i,
i896Ia-2. BonsaU's Estate, 288 Pa. 39, 135'Atl. 724 (z927).

